If Ye Break Faith

This blog is dedicated to the promotion of educating about the Canadian experience of World War One. To discover who we are as a nation in the 21st Century, we must understand our past.


Monday, 19 September 2016

Send Help and Artillery Fire

A Tenuous Line Tenaciously Held; Courcelette, Sept. 1916

“Am in Quarry in front of COURCELETTE.  Enemy attacking on front and left.  My men nearly all wiped out"
 -Capt. H F Renwick,
 O.C. ‘D’ Coy, 
4th Canadian Infantry Battalion, 
19 September 1916



Capt. H F Renwick
Captain Renwick’s ‘D’ Company, 4th (Central Ontario) Battalion was in a most unenviable position.  4th Battalion had relieved the 22nd Battalion on the night of 17 September; a small part of the overall rotation of the fresh 1st Canadian Division into the line at Courcelette in place of the exhausted 2nd Division.  Since taking the village on the 15th in a spectacularly bloody fight, the VanDoos had held off thirteen separate counterattacks despite the numbers they had lost in killed and wounded.   Nothing indicated that these persistent attacks were going to stop anytime soon. 

Positions taken may have been held, but were by no means considered secure.  Defensive lines encompassing Courcelette needed to be improved, strengthened and in some places pushed outward from existing boundaries.  Many sections of the line were incongruous-they didn’t meet.[1]  One such gap existed where a confluence of roads met at the north-east end of town.  Captain Renwick’s company was, then, not in direct touch with units to his left; 3rd (Toronto) Battalion’s ‘D’ Company under the temporary command of Lieutenant Harry Hutchison.  It was a breach nearly fifty yards wide; but that wasn’t the most urgent of the many concerns Renwick faced.  His company now occupied a junction of trenches in the vicinity of the Quarry which lay just beyond the town’s edge.  This place, along with the cemetery a little further south had been the focal point of the continuous German attacks the VanDoos had been contending with since they had captured Courcelette.


When the French-Canadian battalion traded off with the Ontarians on the night of 17/18 September, they had suffered 312 casualties.[2]  Times in between German rushes were filled by an intense artillery fire; gunners on both sides seeking to blast their opponent into a state of incapability to resist a ground assault.  Trenches had been built with the intention of protecting from this, but herein was another difficulty facing Captain Renwick.  The better constructed, deeper and more protective trenches around Courcelette were well behind him, at the south end of town which had been the German front line before the attack of three days prior.  Canadian front line positions were making use of the narrower and comparatively shallow works of the old German support trenches.  3rd Battalion, stretched across seven hundred yards to Renwick’s left (not including the fifty empty yards between them) reported “trenches very poor, where there are any.”[3]  Renwick’s own battalion admitted “the line was taken over…in an unorganised state.”[4] 

Under ideal circumstances, trenches once captured were to be rebuilt and fortified, though in this case, it is evident that the VanDoos did not have much chance to accomplish anything near to a decent consolidation.  It was all they could do to hang onto their gains; making them to desired specifications was beyond limitations.  One thing that had been managed was the pushing of a sap out to an isolated scrape which had created a good outpost position at the periphery of the Quarry.

That aside, when the relief was complete in the small hours of the 18th, the line could not be thought of as ideal, at best, and in the worst case, indefensible.  Autumn rains had been steady for days running, adding to the hardship and degrading trench conditions further.  “Constant artillery fire throughout the night,” Major TP Jones (in command of 4th Battalion while the OC was in hospital) wrote in the War Diary on the take-over, “Trenches wet, and mud one foot deep, making progress difficult.  A number of German wounded still left in trenches, and unable to evacuate them.”[5]  Primary concern was to put effort into making sense out of the ground they were now charged with.  This came straight down the chain from General Gough’s Reserve Army HQ.  1st Canadian Division, specifically 4th Battalion was directed to “clear up (the) situation N. and E. of COURCELETTE.  This was partially done last night (17 Sep.) but there are still parties of Germans holding out.”[6]  These directives made it understood that the line now occupied was to be considered the staging point for the next advance.

Specifically in need of clearing was a pocket trench scarred across the main Albert-Baupame Road.  4th Battalion was set to attack this position at 7pm on 19 September, following a five-hour bombardment from the Corps’ Heavy Artillery.[7]  Proximity of Canadian trenches to the area to be shelled required troops “be withdrawn clear of our present front line along the SUNKEN ROAD…and also from the front line East of the QUARRY.”[8]  ‘D’ Company would have to pull in their outpost that morning, before daybreak and re-occupy it in the evening once the bombardment lifted to secondary targets 250 yards distant.

Owing to poor visibility for aerial observation, the attack was postponed, the bombardment didn’t occur, though Captain Renwick couldn’t replace the garrison at the outpost in daylight and would have to wait until dusk when movement was safer.

A German patrol had taken possession of the outpost in the absence of ‘D’ Company, and when the returning garrison approached, the interlopers sprung an ambush.  “These men were driven back by the enemy with machine guns and bombs and suffered heavy casualties.”[9]  The ambush evolved into a direct attack against ‘D’ Company and by nine o’clock it was fully engaged.  One of the company’s Lewis guns fell into enemy hands “the whole crew of which were casualties.”  Renwick’s left flank was already vulnerable- with that gap between battalions, and now Germans were in a position to cut him off from the right, move through the open left and reduce his company, who were now having to take furtive snapshots against a machine gun which had belonged to them only moments before.  The level of outgoing fire was worrying; there was less of it as time wore on.  Captain Renwick had no lines of communication to his headquarters, and either didn’t want to risk or couldn’t spare a man to run a message.  He hastily scratched out a few lines and sent a pigeon aloft:  “Am in Quarry in front of COURCELETTE.  Enemy attacking on front and left.  My men nearly all wiped out.  Send help and artillery fire.”[10]

His terse tone, succinct yet pleading gives a glimpse of Captain Renwick’s dilemma.  He could keep his company fighting on the ground he still held in the hope his battalion commander, half a mile away at the Sugar Factory could organise a counter attack before the fragile line collapsed and ‘D’ Company was dead to a man.  In that event, Fritz could get right inside Courcelette and be able to take the front-line Canadian trenches from behind.  Renwick could attempt a withdrawal, but such a move would expose his men to fire more so than where they were. How many more would he lose by trying to save them?  Even so, that would still leave the NE edge of town exposed, and Captain Renwick would be held to account for that disaster.  It was better, perhaps, to die trying.

Integrity of the trenches was growing worse, the rain, still pelting, sloughed at muddy walls which had already been shattered to oblivion.  The men of ‘D’ Company were fighting to hold filthy ditches from an unknown number of Germans rushing at them through the miserable night.  Shelling from enemy guns had abated to allow the attack; its absence only amplifying the snap and crack of small arms fire gaining volume and edging closer; spent shot splattering the gruely muck.

Word of the situation reached Battalion HQ; it’s not mentioned how, the pigeon didn’t land until the next morning, and “A heavy artillery barrage was immediately called for….Our artillery did splendid work…especially over the enemy’s trenches opposite the QUARRY, no doubt (it) played a large part breaking up the enemy’s attack.”[11]  4th Battalion’s ‘B’ Company, in the reserve trenches was warned off for a counterattack to go in at 11.15.  Meanwhile, Captain Renwick’s neighbour, Lieutenant Hutchison and his ‘D’ Company from 3rd Battalion swung out and pitched men forward to 4th Battalion lines to reinforce Renwick.  Hutchison led them on, despite having a lame arm from a hit he’d taken the day before which he’d yet to have seen to.

“Lieut. Hutchison handled his company very skillfully and greatly assisted in turning the Hun out.”[12]  During the fight, Hutchison was again wounded, in the same arm, and was persuaded to seek treatment.  His actions would be recognised with the Military Cross.[13]  With his help, Captain Renwick was able to hold out; the German attack vanishing by the time ‘B’ Company appeared, who were able to occupy the outpost line, now abandoned, with very few casualties.[14]

The left edge of the Battalion around the quarry had been dealt a strong blow and the next few hours were invested in shifting elements to strengthen the point most likely to be hit by the next German attack.  ‘B’ Company stayed in place, immediately supplementing what little was left of ‘D’ Company.  These distributions had just been completed at a little after four in the morning when once again German artillery ramped up, signalling another “go” at the Canadian lines.  Well placed Lewis guns and an SOS barrage from Division artillery stopped this attempt before it could develop.  Two hours later, the situation at the Quarry had stabilised.  The line, still incomplete, perhaps insufficient, had nevertheless held.

4th Battalion was taken out of the line that evening, its short but sharply eventful tour had shorn strength by eight officers and one hundred fifty other ranks,[15] the majority from Captain Renwick’s hard fought company.[i]

My premier work of fiction, “Killing is a Sin: A Novel of the First World War” is now available for download through Kindle Direct Publishing:

Much like the essays and articles I have written which are being appreciated by a growing audience; I put a great deal of effort into telling a story of moral questioning in the setting of the Western Front in 1917 as realistic as possible.  In crafting the environment and situation my characters experience throughout the book, a lot of time was spent consulting the very same war diaries which I have been using to accurately portray the situation of the war in my non-fiction work.  “Killing is a Sin” takes my strengths as an accurate and expositive essayist to give a genuine feel to a work of the imagination. 

I sincerely hope that those of you who have been enjoying my articles here with “If Ye Break Faith” would also be captivated by the story told within “Killing is a Sin,” where Corporal Felix Strachan is faced with having to find an answer to his own question- “What does it mean to die well?”



[1] 1st Canadian Division War Diary, September 1916, Appendix 18
[2] War Diary Entry, 22nd Battalion, 18 September 1916
[3] War Diary Entry, 3rd Battalion, 18 September 1916
[4] War Diary Entry, 4th Battalion, 18 September 1916
[5] War Diary Entry, 4th Battalion, ibid.
[6] 1st Canadian Division War Diary, September 1916, Appendix 18
[7] 1st Canadian Division Operations Order 111, 19 September 1916
[8] 1st Canadian Division Operations Order 111, ibid.
[9] Report- 1st Can Infantry Bde. To 1st Can Div. 23 September 1916 (1 Can Bde. War Diary Sept. 1916 appendix “R”)
[10] War Diary Entry, Canadian Corps, 20 September , 1916
[11] Report- 1st Can Infantry Bde. Ibid.
[12] War Diary Entry, 3rd Battalion, 19 September 1916
[13] Supplement to the London Gazette No. 29824, 14 November 1916, pg. 11078
[14] War Diary Entry, 4th Battalion, 19 September 1916
[15] War Diary Entry, 4th Battalion, 20 September 1916




[i] All Primary Sources Cited, and Information Used to Construct this Article is due to the courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.

Monday, 12 September 2016

Not War, But Bloody Butchery

Taking and Holding Courcelette, September, 1916

“General, I have the honour of commanding the finest body of men I have ever seen”
-Lt Col E Hilliam, O.C.
25th Canadian   Infantry Battalion



"Battle of Courcelette"
by Louis Alexander Weirter  Beaverbrook Collection of War Art 
What little was left standing of Courcelette had either been incorporated into hasty defensive positions or had been too shattered to provide much useful purpose.  Several small fires among the ruins provided a flitting backlight for the engineers who’d been sent forward to build redoubts for twenty rifles and two machine guns each[1] that were to provide pivot points for the holding of a prize the Germans were loath to relinquish.  Already, several counterattacks had been repulsed; each one heralded by a furious bombardment.  More were to come.


Isolated skirmishes in the preceding weeks had helped to gain advantageous start lines for a broad advance.  The Reserve Army, of which the Canadian Corps was part would provide and aggressive cover to the left flank of the main effort to be made by Fourth Army.[2]  Unlike the plan of attack which opened the Somme battle on 1 July; which had placed emphasis on the achievement of that day’s final objectives, experience influenced a shift in putting focus on primary targets with contingencies in place such that success could be exploited to gain subsequent objectives.  Here, then, was a first large scale implementation of a leap-frog style of attack which would come to be known as “bite and hold” tactics.  If the new line could be held, the men and officers of the Canadian Corps would have done a large part of proving the approach to defeating defensive stalemate was best done in incremental gains rather than setting sights on distant goals.


“The Capture of the Sugar Refinery at Courcelette
 by the Canadians on September 15, 1916
” 
 by Fortunino Matania Beaverbrook Collection of War Art 
The 2nd Canadian Division would first move against German trenches nicknamed “Candy” and “Sugar” and then reduce the German strongpoints at the destroyed Sucerie, the beet refinery which leant much to the “sweet” codenames.  A thorough artillery bombardment on these lines would precede the infantry assault, but the real ingenuity of the day for the gunners would be in laying down a precisely timed “creeping barrage.”  Two batteries of 18 pounders would fire a specific programme designed to lift and shift trajectory and range in coordination with the infantry.  In the first few minutes the guns were to change from shelling fifty yards short of the German front line, to the front line itself, then lifting and increasing range one hundred yards each at two three minute intervals.[3]  All this would be done while maintaining a high rate of fire- four rounds per minute per gun-to create a protecting barrier for the infantry to move behind. 


For the most part, it worked.  21st Battalion, on the left edge of the Corps’ front encountered very little resistance at first.  “No difficulty was experienced in taking 1st line trench as the artillery had thoroughly demolished this trench and killed most of the occupants.”[4]  Resistance was more stubborn beyond the front line, mainly from machine guns garrisoned around the ruined Sugar Factory.  “Our troops, however, knowing this to be well defended, attacked it with great vigour.”[5]   From Zero hour at 6.55 am, it was a little more than an hour before the message “Sugar Factory entirely in our hands”[6] was received at 2nd Division Headquarters from the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and another hour more before all attacking battalions reported reaching their objectives.  This was a gain, across the Corps front 2200 yards wide of 400-1000 yards in depth.[7]


What had hoped to be of help in the attack, but turned out to be anticlimactic and largely
inconsequential was the first battlefield deployment of tanks.  Of the six Mark I Tanks from No. 1 Section, ‘C’ Company, Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps assigned to the 2nd Division’s attack, four became stuck or otherwise immobile on the way to their objectives.  The other two, No.’s 721 and 509 reached positions at the Sugar Factory, but only after the infantry had taken the objective.[8]  This sojourn would be helpful in improving future use, and it had an enormous psychological effect on both sides.  Attacking infantry were bolstered by the presence of these machines, while defenders were terrified.  No. 721, commanded by Captain Inglis took the surrender of more than fifty Germans.[9]  It was later reported to Major General Turner’s 2nd Division HQ that after a tank had gone astride a German trench and enfiladed it with heavy fire, a “prisoner’s opinion of Tanks say it is not war but bloody butchery.”[10]   General Turner’s own assessment was that of promise- what these weapons could become- as a possible vanguard to assisting the infantry by “increasing the enemy’s demoralization and keeping him on the run; thereby enabling units…to push well out in front and possibly into a further objective.”[11]  Turner’s superior, Corps Commander Lt General Julian Byng concurred on their potential, but cautioned that “No action of the infantry should ever be made subservient to that of the tanks.”[12]


This was rather academic on the day of battle, as by the point of Byng deciding to press his next set of objectives, there were no tanks capable of continuing.  4th Brigade’s quick and aggressive seizure of the Sugar Factory was echoed by similar victories for the main portion of the attack being made by Fourth Army.  At 11.00, General Byng issued orders to 2nd Division, that “Preparations will be made to exploit success already gained by a further advance of the Canadian Corps”[13] pushing towards Courcelette.  The 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade would pass through the morning’s gains; 25th (Nova Scotia Rifles) Battalion left, 22nd (French Canadian, aka “VanDoos”) Battalion right with 26th (New Brunswick) Battalion in close support, all behind another creeping barrage.  Needing time to organise and coordinate the infantry and artillery, as well as allowing for 3rd British Corps to secure a flank at Martinpuich[14] meant that 5th Brigade couldn’t go into action before six that evening.  In the meantime, 2nd Division was receiving conflicting reports on enemy strength at the village.  One had indicated the Germans were massing at Courcelette, while another, sent shortly afterward estimated it was only being held by light rearguards and snipers.[15]


“At 6.15,” the VanDoo’s War Diary states, “assault launched.”  Brevity of this report matches the swiftness of the action.  “The 22nd Battalion, after a sharp fight of 10 minutes, during which the bayonet was freely used, arrived at their objectives at 6.45 pm.”[16]  The VanDoos secured the north east end of Courcelette by seven, immediately consolidating their new position. 


Lt. Colonel Edward Hilliam, O.C. 25th Battalion advancing on the left of the VanDoos would later submit a handwritten report on his unit in battle. “We moved 2000 (yards)….under heavy artillery fire…and not a single hitch.”[17]  They, too gained their objective “after a sharp bayonet fight of 5 minutes,”[18] making their objective at 6.25 pm.  Fighting may have been brief, but it was costly.  “All the officers of B and C Coy’s,” says Hilliam, “were killed or wounded excepting Lieut. De Young of ‘B’ Coy (since wounded) and Lt. Matheson, ‘C’ Coy.  These two boys, that is all they are, were so excellent that I am sending their names in later.”[19]  Colonel Hilliam was true to his word.  Lt.’s De Young; (whose left arm had been fractured by a machine gun bullet), and Matheson would both receive the Military Cross for their conspicuous gallantry on the day.  While extolling his men -“young soldiers behaving like veterans, going through a very heavy artillery barrage without a quiver”[20]- for their courage and dedication, modesty seems to disallow Hilliam mentioning that he was also wounded during the attack.  Despite this, he remained with his battalion.


During the night, counterattacks came, were repulsed, only to come on again.  Shelling was intense; the night sky lit by the flare of explosions, signal rockets of arranged colours showing green and red
to alert men miles away to bring their guns to action.  Smaller affairs, the rending crunch of bombs and grenades were followed by screams and curses, all punctuated by tongues of hot flame, winking out of blackness, the flicker of flashing rifle fire.  Men of the 5th Brigade held firm; they would not be driven off.  Using the 26th Battalion as a “flying squad” to reinforce gaps in the tine to drive off several strong patrols and bombing attacks, the 25th and 22nd remained stalwart in their new line, absorbing a total of seventeen separate attempts by the Germans to re-take Courcelette between 15-17 September.  Within those days, in which “no other Canadian ever defended against such a sustained fury of attacks during the war,”[21] the 22nd Battalion suffered 207 casualties, the 25th 222, and the 26th 224.[22]  Tenacity won out, and Courcelette remained in Canadian Hands.[i]




My premier work of fiction, “Killing is a Sin: A Novel of the First World War” is now available for download through Kindle Direct Publishing:

Much like the essays and articles I have written which are being appreciated by a growing audience; I put a great deal of effort into telling a story of moral questioning in the setting of the Western Front in 1917 as realistic as possible.  In crafting the environment and situation my characters experience throughout the book, a lot of time was spent consulting the very same war diaries which I have been using to accurately portray the situation of the war in my non-fiction work.  “Killing is a Sin” takes my strengths as an accurate and expositive essayist to give a genuine feel to a work of the imagination. 

I sincerely hope that those of you who have been enjoying my articles here with “If Ye Break Faith” would also be captivated by the story told within “Killing is a Sin,” where Corporal Felix Strachan is faced with having to find an answer to his own question- “What does it mean to die well?”


[1] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Division, 15 September 1916
[2] Philpott, William, “Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme” Abacus 2009 pg. 359
[3] 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery Operations Order 69, 14 September 1916
[4] War Diary Entry, 21st Canadian Infantry Battalion, 15 September 1916
[5] Report: “Operations 21st Battalion 14-15 September 1916” Appended to War Diary September 1916
[6] Field Message from 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade to 2nd Canadian Division rec’d 8.15 am 15 September 1916
[7] Nicholson, GW, Col. “Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War” Queen’s Printer, Ottawa 1962 pg. 169
[8] Inglis, AM, Capt. “Report of Operations of the Tanks of No. 1 Section, ‘C’ Company, Heavy Section Machine Gun Corps, September 16 1915
[9] Inglis, ibid.
[10] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Division, 15 September 1915
[11] Turner, RE, Maj. Gen., Report on Tanks in action, submitted to Canadian Corps 19 September 1916
[12] Byng, J Lt. Gen., report on Tanks in Action, submitted to Reserve Army, 21 September 1916
[13] Field Message from Canadian Corps to 2nd Canadian Division rec’d 11.30 am 15 September 1916
[14] Nicholson, GW, Col., ibid. pg.170
[15] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Division, 15 September 1916
[16] War Diary Entry, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 15 September 1916
[17] Hilliam, Edward, Lt. Col. Report on 25th (Nova Scotia Rifles) Battalion in action, 15 September 1916, submitted to 5th Can. Inf. Bde.
[18] Operations Report, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, September 1916
[19] Hilliam, Edward, Lt. Col. Ibid.
[20] War Diary Entry, 25th Battalion
[21] Cook, Tim, “At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great war 1914-1916” Penguin, Canada 2007, pg. 461
[22] Nicholson, GW, Col., ibid. pg. 171



[i] All Primary Sources Cited, and Information Used to Construct this Article is due to the courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.

Monday, 5 September 2016

Alone and Lightly Armed

Actions at the Somme, Early September 1916

“The Commander-in-Chief has asked the Corps Commander to convey his heartiest congratulations to all ranks, 2nd Batt’n on their achievement this afternoon.”
-Field Message to 1st Canadian Division from Canadian Corps’ Headquarters,
9 September 1916[1]


Acting Corporal Leo Clarke had been given orders to lead his section in clearing out towards the left extremity of the German trenches which 2nd Battalion had just taken.  Once there, his section was to provide cover for Sergeant Nicholl’s group from the battalion’s Bombing Platoon, tasked to create a blocking position to protect the flank of the newly won ground.  Corporal Clarke had a small problem with the job he’d been given.  By the time the objective had been reached, he didn’t have a section left.  They’d either been killed or wounded proceeding down the trench; the fighting to get through between narrow walls had been nasty, close, hand-to-hand murder.  Clarke’s section had used up their Mills bombs in the getting there, and all he had to defend his stand was his Webley revolver.  With no one left able to help him, Corporal Clarke carried on as best he could to create a decent fighting position, putting a barricade together with what he had on hand.  A counterattack could be moments away.

So far, the enemy had shown an unexpected resilience.  Just at the hour of 2nd Battalion’s attack, Canadian Corps had received a telling report on German prisoners captured earlier that afternoon: “Two deserters came over to 1st Bde…two hours ago.  They came back (from a transfer to the Eastern Front) and have been two days in front line….In this man’s company, there were 7 killed and 6 wounded this morning, 50 casualties last night…..The battalion had a very bad time in the trenches, and in another 24 hours they would not be very much good for further fighting.”[2]  This only seemed to corroborate a similar report forwarded to Reserve Army from Canadian Corps that morning.  The previous day, “Two Germans surrendered about midnight and report enemy very nervous and fearing an attack.”[3]  If this intelligence could be trusted (it wasn’t unknown to send “deserters” across the line to sow disinformation), Haig’s “wearing out battle”[4] was having its desired effect.  Months of keeping pressure on the Germans here at the Somme seemed to be syphoning strength and moral will.  Another concerted effort across a wide front; a general offensive in the works for mid-September, just might punch though a thinned crust of resistance and open the war up, at last.

Before such a large scale effort could go ahead, several small, very limited positional battles would be required to shake out and even up the proposed start line.  This meant sorting out the mesh of trenchlines which were the result of the summer’s assaults and counterattacks.  Portions of the German front line created spurs which would pose a problem with a broad axis of advance in keeping touch with flanking units.  One such hitch was a thorn at the divide between the British VI Corps and the Canadians.  A hasty attack to gain this portion of the German line, isolating it and then incorporating it into the British line would be of vital importance to upcoming operations.  The frontage to be attacked was fairly narrow.  A single, determined battalion with its companies advancing in waves was considered adequate to the task.  Conceived and confirmed only hours before it was set to occur, the orders were delivered to 2nd Battalion out of trenches in 1st Brigade reserve on the evening of 8 September.  On the morning of the 9th, the battalion would relieve at the front line and be prepared to go into action at quarter to five that afternoon.[5]

“Relief completed 1.25 pm,” the Battalion War Diary states, “Companies moved into position preparatory to attack.”[6]  Specially built “jumping off” trenches had been dug slightly forward of the main line, and here the assaulting waves sheltered, bayonets fixed, waiting for the tremendous covering barrage which would signal them to advance.

2nd (East Ontario) Canadian Infantry Battalion was one of the Corps’ most veteran units.  Part of the First Contingent raised at the onset of the war in 1914, the battalion had been in France, at every major engagement experienced by Canada’s young army since February 1915.[7]  By this point, few of its number were from the Battalion’s origin.  Many were reinforcements who’d come along since, including Corporal Clarke who’d finagled a transfer to 2nd Battalion so he might serve alongside his brother.[8]





Zero hour, 4.45 pm, the “barrage opened, men leapt over the parapet.”[9]  There was nearly two hundred yards of no-man’s land to cross before reaching the German line, and initially it seemed that little effort was made in stopping them.  Companies on the right flank gained lodgement without losing a man, linking up with VI Corps’ men from 15 (Scottish) Division a few minutes past five o’clock.  Along the left edge, Jerry proved more stubborn.  Before they could storm the trench, “men were held up for a few minutes by heavy machine gun fire.”[10]  In what was later described by a witness as “the bravest thing I ever saw,” Lieutenant J P Pringle charged the machine gun on his own, “and killed the crew with his revolver.”[11]  Lt. Pringle was fatally wounded in the act, but his sacrifice allowed the attack to proceed.  This unnamed witness and “Ontario officer” quoted in the Grand Prairie Herald eulogised him by stating Lt. Pringle “knew the danger he faced when he made his dash, but he was built of the stock that would give his life without hesitation.”[12]  With the machine gun out of action, the left trench could be seized.  By 5.08 pm, 2nd Battalion held their objectives, the situation reported by the attack commander, Major Vanderwater was “well in hand.”[13]  His artillery Forward Observing Officer would have a working telephone line to Divisional guns enabling on call support before six o’clock.[14]  All that remained was to secure the flanks and create the blocking positions and bombing posts which were the responsibility of the Battalion Bombing Platoon.[15]


It was imperative to the success of future operations that this German trench be held at all cost.  Every man in the attacking force would have had that impressed upon him, which lends reason to why Corporal Clarke remained where he was, alone and lightly armed at the extreme left of his battalion.  He wasn’t alone for long, but not in a good way.  Some twenty Germans, led by two officers were filing down this section of trench, directly towards him, intent on pushing the flank.  Clarke’s actions were astounding, immediate and personally reckless; but also absolutely correct.  Without hesitation, he advanced towards the enemy, firing his pistol as he went, having no shortage of targets in the trench’s confines.  When his Webley was emptied, he then took up a discarded German rifle, and continued forward, still firing.  One of the officers engaged at bayonet point, scoring touch on Clarke’s thigh, who quickly shot him dead in return.  Clarke then fetched up another Mauser, running through that rifle’s magazine as well, now having turned the enemy around, fleeing in panic by the way they had come.  Reloading his revolver, he dispatched four of the five Germans attempting to escape, making a prisoner of the fifth.  Corporal Clarke was personally credited with killing eighteen of the enemy, and single-handedly holding the crucial left flank. 

These actions would be deemed worthy of the British Empire’s highest decoration, the Victoria Cross.  Clarke’s award would be one of three earned by men who’d lived at Pine Street, Winnipeg- which would be renamed “Valour Road” in honour of the trio.[16]

Corporal Clarke would never know of his award.  Before it was announced, Leo Clarke died of internal bleeding after being buried by shellfire in October.[17][i]


My premier work of fiction,


is now available for download through 
Kindle Direct Publishing.

Much like the essays and articles I have written which are being appreciated by a growing audience; I put a great deal of effort into telling a story of moral questioning in the setting of the Western Front in 1917 as realistic as possible.  In crafting the environment and situation my characters experience throughout the book, a lot of time was spent consulting the very same war diaries which I have been using to accurately portray the situation of the war in my non-fiction work.  “Killing is a Sin” takes my strengths as an accurate and expositive essayist to give a genuine feel to a work of the imagination. 

I sincerely hope that those of you who have been enjoying my articles here with “If Ye Break Faith” would also be captivated by the story told within “Killing is a Sin,” where Corporal Felix Strachan is faced with having to find an answer to his own question- “What does it mean to die well?”


[1] 1st Canadian Division War Diary, Appendix 9, September 1916
[2] War Diary Entry, Canadian Corps, 9 September 1916
[3] Canadian Corps Report to Reserve Army, 9 September 1916
[4] Boraston, J H, Lt Col (ed.), “Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches” J M Dent & Sons Ltd. 1919, pg. 17
[5] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion, 9 September 1916
[6] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion ibid.
[7] www.cefresearch.ca
[8] Hamilton, Robert, “Victoria Cross Heroes of World War One” Atlantic Publishing, 2015 pg. 60
[9] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion ibid.
[10] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion ibid.
[11] Grand Prairie Herald, Tuesday, October 10 1916 via veterans.gc.ca
[12] Grand Prairie Herald, Tuesday, October 10 1916 via veterans.gc.ca
[13] War Diary Entry, 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion ibid.
[14] Field Message from 1st Canadian Division to Canadian Corps 5.25 pm 9 September 1916 (1st Canadian Division War Diary, App. 9)
[15] 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion Operations Order 25 (1st Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary Appendix September 1916)
[16] Hamilton, Robert, “Victoria Cross Heroes of World War One” ibid.
[17] Richardson, JW, Major RAMC, “Army Form I.1237 ‘Medical Case Sheet’” re: 72132 Clarke, LB A/Cpl



[i] All Primary Sources Cited, and Information Used to Construct this Article is due to the courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.