It
is a curious thing, from a civil standpoint, how an army can endure such
conditions, fierce and fearsome as are found on the front line, and continue to
operate beyond what must seem the limit of human endurance. The well regarded, if not sometimes
controversial historian Niall Ferguson, in his work on WWI muses “Given the
awfulness of the conditions soldiers had to endure the most surprising thing of
all about the war, perhaps, is that military discipline did not break down much
more often, or earlier, than it did.”[1]
His curiosity is not misplaced, but reveals that from his perspective there is
no intimate understanding of how the military functions as a system. As the military is poised to operate at such
extremes, it must be structured to incorporate those extremes and still
function effectively. That structure is
found, in both deterrent and encouraging factors within one key element:
Discipline.
Professor
Gary Sheffield writes: “Armies in
the First World War drew upon a pool of recruits, some of which were already
accustomed to industrial discipline in factories and other workplaces…. Even
so, all armies subjected new recruits to basic training which ranged from the
unpleasant to the brutal, the aim being to break down the individuality of the
new soldiers and to mould them into a group that would carry out orders
unquestioningly….
“Military discipline makes the difference between
a mob and an army. It is a form of behaviour that is the consequence of
training and indoctrination, designed to ensure compliance to orders among
individuals and groups, to create and maintain cohesion in military units.”[2]
Discipline is the foundation upon which the
military is based. With clear, simple
and easy to understand rules a soldier is indoctrinated to appreciate what
behaviour is expected, what will be rewarded and what will be punished.
“Military discipline is rather different from the code of conduct found in any
other workplace. It has to be….It has long
been recognised, in all armies, that a legal code designed to regulate civilian
society is impractical for the business of waging war.”[3]
To that end, the military has a very rigid and
codified system of laws and conduct. For
the Canadian expeditionary Force, these laws, offences and the procedures for
addressing them were found within the King’s Regulations and Orders for the
Canadian Militia; the Manual of Military Law; the guide: A Manual for the
Canadian Militia (Infantry); and the Canadian Officer’s Guide to the Study of
Military Law.[4]
“The whole purpose of military law is to maintain the discipline of the army,
and acts and omissions that in civil law may be mere breaches of contract…must,
by the very nature of what the army is for, be made offenses that attract
penalties.”[5]
The most egregious of those offenses, which would
attract the most severe penalties would be dealt with a trial by Court
Martial. Library and Archives Canada
lists in their database 11,878 Courts Martial occurred for the CEF during WWI,
with the understanding that the number includes serial offenders.[6]
Lesser crimes were tried within the Regimental or Company level as “Summary
Offences”, since Courts Martial were reserved for more serious offences, or
were recommended if it was believed an infraction merited a more strict
punishment. It was to the discretion of
the commanding officer which would be tried as such, or which would be held over
for Courts Martial.[7]
While the powers of punishment at this level were remarkably less severe, it
did afford the opportunity to handle disciplinary matters “in house” as opposed
to involving higher command and quite possibly putting a battalion and its
command in a negative light. Similarly,
further down the chain, more minor infractions, which at times might merit a
summary trial would be dealt, unofficially, with what is known as
“Administrative Punishment.” In order
not to draw lapses of discipline and thus scrutiny from above, errant soldiers
might find themselves in possession of extra duties, be automatically
volunteered for unenviable jobs or be dealt with in a more “hands on” way.
As far as punishments went, Courts Martial were
the only disciplinary procedure to have had the authority to issue a capital
sentence. “There were 361 military
executions carried out in the armies of Great Britain and the British Empire
during the First World War. A further
2,719 death sentences were passed and eventually commuted. Within the Canadian Expeditionary Force
specifically, there were 25 executions and another 197 death sentences were
commuted.”[8]
Of those twenty-five, twenty-two were
executed for desertion, one for cowardice, and two for murder.
There are some important factors to place into
the consideration regarding this type of penalty. First is the severe consequences which may
occur du to the offence- such as a collapse of order from mutiny, desertion or
severe insubordination (i.e. striking a superior); or placing other’s lives at
risk with cowardice or being asleep at a sentry post. The nature of the crime may be one that would
reflect poorly upon the military as a whole, such as murder, sexual offenses or
looting. Another consideration is that
these punishments, as they were severe, were not dealt out lightly. Not quite two percent of Courts Martial for
the CEF resulted in a sentence of death, and of those, only 12% were carried
out.
Nor was an execution as swift as public imagination may have it- the condemned dragged from his conviction to a brick wall and blindfold. All such sentences needed to be confirmed by the Commander in Chief (Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, from 1915 onward, preceded by Sir John French) who would only be required to do so if no one else in the chain of command from brigade to corps to army, then to C-in-C had deferred the sentence. This process put a great level of check into the system to ensure that utmost attention to law and procedure had been upheld.
Nor was an execution as swift as public imagination may have it- the condemned dragged from his conviction to a brick wall and blindfold. All such sentences needed to be confirmed by the Commander in Chief (Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, from 1915 onward, preceded by Sir John French) who would only be required to do so if no one else in the chain of command from brigade to corps to army, then to C-in-C had deferred the sentence. This process put a great level of check into the system to ensure that utmost attention to law and procedure had been upheld.
“On 16 August 2006, British Defence Secretary Des Browne announced that
the government would issue full pardons for all 306 Commonwealth soldiers who
were executed under these circumstances [specifically desertion and
cowardice-CJH] during World War One.”[9]
These pardons have come after lengthy
campaigns of public support from relatives of those executed and human rights
groups. This placed pressure on the
government to act, without addressing the public perception of law and justice
is often not congruent with the way in which those concepts work in a military
context. Naturally, there is some
dissention from those who have an innate understanding of how the military operates
that these men have been exonerated for their severe offences; regardless of
whether or not those crimes committed today would warrant a death
sentence.
Something else to be observed is that the punishments awarded for
infractions, from the unofficial “administrative” level, to the most severe
capital case, is not only to have in place consequences for behaviour, but that
they are also a symbolic act of purification.
A soldier who stands his punishment and returns to his unit is regarded
as having been cleansed. Even the coward
or deserter being put to the post can be said to at least have had the courage
enough to face his final volley.
A
rigid system of this sort would be of little use, though, if it were not made
clear to soldiers not only what behaviour would result in punishment, but why;
as well as the corollary- what behaviour was expected and how adherence to this
conduct could be rewarded. “Discipline was an
important factor in holding armies together, but it was not the only one.
Depending on the army and the individual, belief in the cause, loyalty to unit
and/or comrades, leadership and other issues were also significant.”[10] There are few better explanations of this balance than that offered by Captain John Paul Jones upon the founding of the US Navy during the American Revolution. In his opinion a good officer observed that “No meritorious act of a subordinate should escape his attention or be left to pass without its reward, even if the reward is only a word of approval. Conversely, he should not be blind to a single fault in any subordinate, though at the same time, he should be quick and unfailing to distinguish error from malice, thoughtlessness from incompetency, and well meant shortcomings from heedless or stupid blunder.”[11] This is the nature which exists in the modern era as the proviso of “Never Pass a Fault,” to not allow a mistake, no matter how minor go unnoticed and uncorrected. This idea alone ensures a high standard of behaviour among service personnel.
Through
a strict balance of these two factors, reward and punishment can discipline be
achieved to the point that it can withhold the stresses of war. “In fact, high
casualty rates do not correlate consistently with collapses of morale. Some of the most reliable regiments on both
sides were the ones which suffered the highest casualties.”[12]
In
an age where once again veterans of the armed forces are highly regarded by the
public they serve, it becomes important to rely on the high standard of
personal behaviour which they were subjected to in that service. Elements such as personal accountability,
decorum and deportment in public can help to set the standard and a good
example to follow which will continue to inspire public support. Falling into bad habits, appearing in public
agitated or crude and airing grievances in a public forum in an aggressive and
accusatory way is not only contrary to the conduct we once abided by, it will
serve to turn that support, so dearly won, against us.
[8] Iacobelli, Teresa
“Death or Deliverance: Canadian Courts Martial in the Great War” UBC Press,
2013 pg 4
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